Healthy Industries and Unhealthy Populations: Lessons from Indian Problem-Solving by unknown
183
 Introduction 
 The Indian health industry, with substantial pharmaceuticals and biop-
harmaceuticals capability, has been called ‘Supplier to the World’. This 
industry has had three defining policy environments running from 1950 
to 2000, the last of which is arguably still ongoing. These three environ-
ments are distinct  market environments, in which the range of market 
instruments used has been notable and the public gains to which they 
have been put have been noteworthy (Srinivas, 2004; 2012). 
 In earlier work (Srinivas, 2012) I have provided an explanatory frame-
work for addressing the long timeline this history represents in the polit-
ical economy of health plans in a late industrial push. In the process of 
analyzing 50 years of capability building, that study demonstrated that 
India had accomplished a great deal on the supply of medicines, espe-
cially generics, vaccines, and diagnostic kits, but was far less impressive 
in its health outcomes. This chapter builds further on the analysis in 
that work, but specifically turns its attention to  problem-solving : the type 
of state capacity required to reconcile industrial and health goals as an 
essential part of development plans (Srinivas, 2014a). In examining the 
experience of the First Market Environment, this chapter argues that no 
explanation of its history is complete, indeed at all relevant, unless we 
attend to why a state so capable along one dimension can be so wanting 
in another (Srinivas, 2004; 2012). 1 
 The importance of India’s ‘First Market Environment’ 
 The First Market Environment (FME) had two distinct market phases: 
Phase I, from 1950 through the 1960s, and then Phase II running still 
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powerfully until the late 1970s. Phase I was the  public sector produc-
tion effort under immense state regulation. This period included 
the Industries Development and Regulation Act (IDRA) of the 1950s 
that had been designed to boost indigenous production, diversifica-
tion and investment, followed by the Industrial Policy Resolution of 
1956, the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 and 
the Drugs (Display of Prices) Order promulgated in 1962 which was 
then adapted many times over in both the First and Second Market 
Environments. 
 In contrast to Phase I of the FME during which the public sector led 
in most respects, Phase II of the FME was marked by a focus on Indian 
 private firms . Again, the state was busy. Its actions included the with-
drawal of permissions for industrial diversification to foreign-owned 
firms in 1970, the Drug Price Control Order (DPCO) in 1970 and two 
changes to the Indian Patent Act in 1970 and 1972. Then, in 1978, the 
New Drug Policy (NDP) of the Government of India followed. The NDP 
provided explicit goals (although some in conflict) and three powerful 
categories of its own for drugs and their production licenses: 17 essential 
drugs preferentially and solely allocated to the public sector, 27 drugs for 
production only by Indian firms and 64 drugs open to production by 
anyone (for details, see Srinivas, 2012: chapter 3). 
 The Second Market Environment (SME) overlaps slightly with Phase II 
of the FME in the continuing focus on essential medicines. It runs from 
the 1980s and into the 1990s. However, the SME is distinct in the receding 
power of the state and the visibility instead of three powerful interna-
tional effects on Indian firms especially in the 1980s. These included the 
three ‘Ws’: the Waxman-Hatch Act of the US (1984), which provided 
strong incentives for foreign companies that manufactured generics; the 
WTO’s new pressures (1985) on the Trade in Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) harmonization and patent reforms; and the WHO and other 
multilateral agencies’ procurement efforts for vaccines and other drugs 
which disproportionately influenced the technical standards of produc-
tion (Srinivas, 2004; 2012). 
 In summary, Phase I of the FME built a political rhetoric of universal 
access while using strong state controls of the market and privileges of 
the public sector; Phase II of the FME showed a strong push to domestic, 
private sector capabilities while using public health drugs such as anti-
biotics to channel both policy design and private sector behaviour. 
Indigenous supply capabilities were therefore built over the two Phases, 
first in the public, then in the private sector, of deep investments, slow 
technological learning and directed technology transfer. By the end 
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of the FME in the early 1980s, India had emerged as a redoubtable 
contender amongst developing nations with pharmaceutical capability, 
and was challenging even some industrialized economies. 
 The industrial capabilities of the FME were built with clearer plans for 
public health – such as the supply of essential medicines – than in any 
subsequent period (Srinivas, 2004; 2012). Unlike the FME, which was 
inward-looking in order to build indigenous capabilities, the state in the 
SME especially from the early 1980s used a variety of market and non-
market instruments to induce firms to export. Because of the consid-
erable capabilities built in the FME, private indigenous firms stood to 
make lucrative gains from export markets. Unlike the FME, the SME 
through the overseas buying instruments of the 1980s was determinedly 
focussed on upgrading for export markets and on what I have argued 
elsewhere is the welfare-state priorities of other nations, not necessarily 
those of India (Srinivas, 2011; 2012). 
 The SME acted as an important culling zone for firms that were inter-
nationally uncompetitive. It also heralded international influences on 
Indian firms that could not be carefully scripted and regulated by the 
state. With growing vaccine capability alongside generics, the SME 
also signalled the growing attraction of large-scale procurement from 
multilateral agency buyers such as UNICEF and the WHO. The state was 
undoubtedly less able to control export markets. 
 Finally, what followed and arguably still exists is a less distinct Third 
Market Environment (TME) associated with technological shifts in biop-
harmaceuticals begun in the 1980s and into the 2000s. In important 
respects these capabilities grew alongside and converged with vaccines 
in the SME, and with a range of other products and processes in the 
TME. The state in the TME was far less visible relative to the FME, but 
more decisive than in the SME. Yet, because of shifting technological 
considerations, the state’s control of domestically owned indigenous 
private firms far was less than in even the SME. 
 This Third Market Environment provides an uncertain regulatory envi-
ronment for new technological frontiers, where the national ownership 
and national priorities are more ambiguous. Substantial mergers and 
acquisitions have occurred, new technology capabilities are emerging 
and new regulatory zones in science and engineering are being explored. 
Furthermore, manufacturing capabilities have taken something of a 
backseat to the build-out of private sector opportunities in insurance, 
logistics, clinics, hospitals and so forth. Technological advances have 
created the need for a fundamental new balancing between production 
capabilities and the certainty of access to medicines. 
186 Smita Srinivas
 Problem-solving versus state capacity 
 The three market environments exemplify different tensions arising 
from growing supply capabilities. How then can industrial and health 
goals be reconciled as an essential element of development planning? 
The argument here is that to address this question it is insufficient to 
focus on the diffuse notion of state capacity. Rather, much more can be 
induced from a focus on problem-solving, to see how industrial capa-
bilities can inch closer to health outcomes. Should the health industry 
be an economic engine or a means to healthier populations? If it is a 
means, then the outcomes should be measured in terms of healthier 
populations. If it is an end, then some troubling developmental tensions 
remain. 
 What, then, is missing in the explanations to date? The two-decade 
period of the FME requires dissection because it is tempting to see the 
technological supply-side gains from start to finish in the relatively 
straightforward terms of a move from less to more capable state and 
firms. Without the detailed analysis of subsequent environments and of 
the state’s struggle to align industry and health, the FME is itself difficult 
to bookend and resolve. What becomes hidden is substantial variation 
in the health climate within which the industry was steeped, and the 
obscure logics by which certain industrial policies were prioritized over 
health needs. 
 For late industrial economies such as India, the means rhetoric is far 
more visible in the FME, contrasting with the ends rhetoric in the SME 
and TME. The FME offers the first environment in which the nation-state 
appears explicitly and self-consciously to foster industrial and health 
policies moving closer together. It was the first and only environment 
(Srinivas, 2012) where the range of instruments for policy and planning 
were so wide across both industry and healthcare; they are far less visible 
in later phases (see also Chaudhuri, 1986; Sahu, 1998; Srinivas, 2004). 
 These national politics of the FME include autonomous nation-
building faced with immense hurdles of technology transfer and the 
realpolitik of picking international partner nations. The crucial point is 
that the FME was an important industrial development ‘First’, as well as 
a ‘Market’ first. It was the epitome of a nationally structured and regu-
lated set of market environments across two phases (public and private 
sector industrial capabilities) aimed at building health successes. 
 The lion’s share of attention has focussed on the technical details 
of the FME. Indeed, there is much to extol on the industry side. In 
comparison with Brazil, for instance, the sheer volume of Indian firms, 
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and the concerted set of national industrial policies to keep out foreign 
firms, boost inward technology transfer and develop close state-business 
compacts, points to a redoubtable Indian advance. The broader notion 
of state capacity helps us less in explaining why the state was much 
less successful in ensuring better health delivery in later years, precisely 
when industrial capabilities were growing stronger. It is clear that simple 
causal explanations from industry to health or vice versa offer an incom-
plete analysis. 
 Sahu (1998), for example, clearly demonstrates how tenuous was the 
link to the technology frontier, and how contested in many respects 
(although ultimately collaborative) the relationship between firms and 
the government became in the effort to research, develop and manu-
facture at home. Indeed, some of the contention between domestic 
firms and the government was ultimately resolved precisely because the 
needs of the nation rose to the top, and this was accomplished both 
rhetorically as well as pragmatically (Chaudhuri, 1986; Sahu, 1998). This 
pragmatism at least at national policy levels allowed a series of joint 
initiatives for technology transfer to be put into place between Indian 
and foreign firms and research institutes. It is clear that some types of 
problem-solving – such as those focussed on technological learning – 
were privileged over others. 
 The FME can be understood as a concerted national policy effort to 
synchronize the production of essential items to address several subsec-
tors of health care needs and ensuring access for the population. This 
entailed an effort across multiple geographic territories, institutional 
navigation in India’s complex quasi-federal system of central and state 
governments, and of different urban and rural development planning 
and governance contexts (Srinivas, 2012). Evidence of this diversity 
is seen today, where adjacent subnational states may vary noticeably 
in strategies and instruments to regulate their health industry and its 
firms. 2 Indeed, we could argue that state capacity not only varies but 
that the need to problem-solve becomes more acute, not less, as techno-
logical capabilities advance. Waiting for industrial capabilities to evolve 
fully before systematically addressing health outcomes appears to be a 
dubious recipe. 
 Problem-solving capacity can therefore be termed the ability to 
frame, formulate and attempt to solve complex development challenges 
(see also Srinivas, 2014a). Problem-solving is arguably like exercising 
a muscle. The emphasis therefore is on the attempt to solve complex 
problems, not necessarily on solving them. The more one exercises 
the muscle (the attempt to solve), the stronger the muscle (ability to 
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problem-solve) becomes. The big difference, however, is that the meta-
phor of exercising a muscle refers to single individuals, whereas the 
attempt to problem-solve complex problems requires institutional and 
organizational muscle. In other words, even if an individual might be 
able to think ahead to solutions, a truly complex social problem requires 
institutional and organizational mechanisms to experiment and seed 
the solution. This is what we might term ‘the institutionalization’ of the 
solution. 
 The tradition of using a grounded problem-solving approach is hardly 
new in development. Proponents such as Albert Hirschman (1967) used 
such thinking to probe public performance in development projects and 
to understand how political and economic reform occurred. Despite 
such a history of use, however, the more general idea of governance 
has risen to define and to shape concepts of state capacity, and the 
more specific problem-solving capacity has been obscured. One might 
even suggest that such problem-solving muscle should be the core of 
the state’s capacity in development and health, especially for late indus-
trial economies where such substantial technological capabilities are 
being fostered (Srinivas, 2014a). The FME is an inspirational story when 
analyzed as state capacity directed towards building technological capa-
bilities. It provides a more cautionary tale when seen through the lens of 
state efforts in problem-solving for healthier populations. 
 Problem-solving heuristics as a dynamic element 
of state capacity 
 The rhetorical ‘states versus markets’ development debate is not very 
helpful in the dilemma of effective policy design. The institutional triad 
(Figure 10.1) is a heuristic developed in Srinivas (2012) to show a way to 
understand the evolution of the industry as a whole, and the timeline 
of the Indian case in comparison with others. It offers a first means of 
comparative analysis in problem-solving, and a long timeline to under-
stand the difficult process of planning on three particular institutional 
fronts: (1) production, (2) consumption/demand and (3) delivery. The 
health industry, after all, has several complex relationships to consider 
and is not easily divided under traditional ministries and agencies. The 
Health Ministry, for example, may sometimes control the moral high 
ground, but the Industries Ministry drives the dynamics of investment 
and the returns of firms. The triad therefore makes the policy levers and 
their institutional environment more evident. It reminds us that there 
is no single good or bad option in absolute terms, but there always exist 
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several, continual problem-solving choices to make in development 
terms. 
 The triad’s three vertices refer to (1) production, (2) individual or 
collective consumption or demand and (3) delivery. States not only have 
to juggle any two; they have to juggle all three. As the Indian nation-
state focussed in the FME on (1), the pressure to problem-solve arose in 
deepening capabilities in (1). For a problem-solving agency, the chal-
lenge is that every vertex is connected to every other, and outcomes are 
rarely causal. With the heuristic, I argued then that very few nations 
have successfully juggled all three vertices of the triad for any substan-
tial length of time. We can say that developmental success is more likely 
 as long as state agencies constantly attempt to exercise their  problem-solving 
muscle . 
 Inevitably, if somewhere along the way the outcomes of development 
remain unprioritized, agencies are likely to be solving problems on which 
they have no agreement, which results in conflict. Yet we know that 
even in India there have been attempts to address more than one vertex. 
For example, states such as Karnataka in the south have been experi-
menting with boosting health insurance programs – often co-operative 
health insurance models – to build up consumption/demand (2) and 
improve delivery of hospitalization and certain outpatient services (3). 
Similarly, private hospital chains such as Apollo have been problem-









 Figure 10.1  Institutional triad of health care 
 Source : Srinivas (2012: 8; CCBY permission granted) 
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satellite agencies to boost telemedicine, a technology-driven service 
(long-distance consultation and diagnostics) which connects (1) and 
(3). Telemedicine is a way to solve specific types of problems and is not 
a panacea for all emergency, curative and primary care segments, but 
it can provide an important solution in many rural areas where access 
to medicines produced (1), demand (2) and delivery (3), can all face 
challenges. 
 Developmental problem-solving is surely context- and place-specific 
in strategy. Consider a competing, powerful, developmental view: that 
problem-solving has universal qualities; that what works in Gambia 
should work in India; or that one problem to be solved is very much 
like another. Older writing on development long recognized that prob-
lems were context-driven, did not require ‘big-push’ approaches, but 
had to grapple with the complexity and disequilibria of real-world and 
situated processes. Albert Hirschman, for instance, recognized that the 
aphorism of ‘One thing at a time’ is not always helpful in development, 
since context-specificity required relational strategies unique to places, 
so that one-at-a-time sequencing may not move the developmental dial 
(Hirschman, 1990, and his earlier 1967 work). Later, the idea of ‘good 
enough governance’ (Grindle, 2007) signalled relative solutions and rela-
tive performance of states, governments and bureaucracies. UNCTAD 
(2009, IV), for example, connects ‘problem-solving energies’ to democ-
racy, but while democracy may be helpful to force frequent exercise, it 
is no guarantee either of setting development priorities or of the state’s 
commitment to continue to exercise its problem-solving muscle. 
 When one acknowledges that the three vertices in Figure 10.1 are 
always changing with respect to the other and in response to more 
systemic factors, a focus on problem-solving can point to  development 
plans that are patient. In such plans, long-term and short-term goals are 
set and process and outcomes can be measured. No state can attend to 
all three vertices at once, and technological learning, although it has 
crucial aspects in all dimensions of (1), (2) and (3), is nevertheless not 
sufficient alone. Therefore, development planning that is patient requires 
acknowledging that problem-solving is essential, with clear priorities 
and value-judgements that must be communicated, with measureable 
outcomes. It requires institutional design that constantly exercises and 
rewards this problem-solving muscle. For example, vaccine procurement 
can directly connect production (1) to demand (2) through ambitious 
buying and clear market signals, but unless the public health system is 
energized, delivery (3) may be problematic (see comparable arguments 
for Indian vaccines in Srinivas, 2006; Puliyel and Madhavi, 2008). 
Healthy Industries, Unhealthy Populations: India 191
 Putting patents in their place 
 Once the emphasis is on problem-solving within the state, the design 
of realistic industrial policies can also take credible shape. New indus-
trial policies can thus take on this problem-solving character, offering 
institutional mechanisms through which both productive capabilities 
and beneficial social indicators can be achieved (Srinivas, 2011; 2012). 
Technological advance and learning in these industrializing contexts is a 
specific type of problem-solving capability, but it offers no panacea. 
 Therefore, policies that are too narrow in terms of technolog-
ical advance are unlikely to solve end problems. One example is the 
constant debate on patents. The Indian Patent Act 1970 was a crucial 
catalyst not just to reform the sector’s production and access concerns 
but of the planning and reform process required to set new health goals. 
The Indian Patent Act 1970 was a mechanism to protect processes, not 
products, and was somewhat unexceptional relative to other countries. 
However, with the rise of Indian public and private sector successes and 
the use of the Patent Act as a protectionist tool, the Act became more 
internationally contentious and most visible in the context of the WTO 
TRIPS negotiations. The 1970 Act represented contested terrain: it was 
widely praised by those who wished to boost the learning capabilities 
of Indian firms on the one hand; praised also by those whose goal was 
more affordable access to medicines; and criticized by others who argued 
that the fillip it provided to learning was skewed towards ‘imitation’ and 
‘reverse engineering’ rather than ‘real’ innovation. Finally, it was criti-
cized for creating protectionist and regressive policies. 
 However, the First Market Environment shows that such unilinear 
explanations rely too heavily on patents to explain developmental 
outcomes; much wider problem-solving gaps existed. The carrots offered 
to firms were more extensive than just patents, and were ultimately 
defined by the state’s priorities whatever the economic arguments 
might have been (see also Jacob, 2010: 83). In both the first and second 
phases of the FME, intellectual property rights (IPR) acted in concert 
with a range of other industrial instruments for competition, invest-
ment, infrastructure and a range of health institutional design issues 
(many of which remained unsuccessful). Process patents along with the 
Drug Price Control Order and these other policies forced lowered costs 
through competition (Abrol and Guha, 1986). 
 In the Second Market Environment, Indian firms and policy makers 
faced substantial new pressures to harmonize towards a product patent 
regime. Conflicting views of reform from bureaucrats and politicians 
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underscored that problem-solving with regard to affordable access had 
no single narrative or political rhetoric during the trade harmonization 
negotiations (Jacob, 2010). The elites of the senior Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS) bureaucracy, for example, possessed considerable discretion 
and strategic flexibility in shaping policy design and its reform. 
 Patents offer monopoly protections but are second-best solutions. 
Acting alone, they rarely solve developmental challenges, although 
they may resolve trade pressures. Especially in the FME, patents required 
complementary industrial and social policies including clear foreign 
direct investment (FDI) guidelines, restrictions on monopolies, price 
controls, canalization of bulk drugs, rules for pharmacy procurement 
and use, assumptions about the capacity of clinics and hospitals and 
so on (Basant, 2010; Rai, 2009; Sahu, 1998; Srinivas, 2011, 2012). Some 
actively contend that the more one set of capabilities has advanced, the 
more firms have sought monopoly status and protections of all kinds. 
Madhavi (2013) states definitely that market guarantees and supports 
for public-private partnerships have worked to create the public sector’s 
demise in vaccines. 
 Getting better 
 The FME’s emphasis on universal access pointed policies towards essen-
tial medicines, especially public health priorities such as antibiotics. 
Combined with process patents and price controls, it induced compe-
tition and Indian production capabilities in both public and private 
sectors. The SME saw the introduction of the strongly worded New Drug 
Policy (NDP) (Government of India, 1978). However, the NDP presumed 
that item (5) below was necessarily at the right position and compatible 
with the other goals set out as:
 1.  To develop self-reliance in drug technology; 
 2.  To provide a leadership role to the public sector; 
 3.  To aim at a quick self-sufficiency in the output of drugs with a view 
to reduce the quantum of imports; 
 4.  To foster and encourage the growth of the Indian sector; 
 5.  To ensure that the drugs are available in abundance in the country to 
meet the health needs of our people; 
 6.  To make drugs available at reasonable prices; 
 7.  To keep a careful watch on the quality of production and prevent 
adulteration and malpractices; 
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 8.  To offer special incentives to firms which are engaged in Research and 
Development; and 
 9.  To provide other parameters to control, regulate and rejuvenate this 
industry as a whole, with particular reference to containing and chan-
nelizing the activity of foreign companies in accord with national 
objectives and priorities. 
 The aspirations on the list were noteworthy, but the NDP reflected many 
unresolved triad questions about value ordering of the vertices and 
phasing of priorities. They assumed, for example, that cheap and reli-
able production would solve access to medicines problems. It assumed 
that domestic production was a necessity, but also that such production 
combined with other items on the list was sufficient. Only the fifth item 
in the above list questions this concern most directly. 3 The rest of the 
points notably address industrial production priorities and incentives. 4 
 As Chaudhuri (1986) points out, foreign firms had to be forced into 
certain roles in the industry. Some of them had been established in India 
as early as 1923, began the domestic production of formulations only 
in 1955 and, despite a range of inducements through national pharma-
ceutical policies, had not begun producing bulk drugs even by 1978. 
In contrast, several Indian firms had seized the opportunities to do so 
provided by the state. As I have argued about the FME (Srinivas, 2012: 67), 
‘India’s unique gains in this period were due in part to a multi-pronged 
policy approach with politically defensible market entry points through 
“essential” drugs and protectionist restrictions. But politics would have 
been insufficient without systematic and demonstrable technology 
outcomes and the development agenda focused on the twin goals of 
process technology gains and affordable medicines’. By challenging 
multinational companies in the courts, through national government 
supports and through a range of bureaucratic interventions, through 
the use of monopoly restrictions, production allocation licenses, price 
controls and process patents, Indian problem-solving was already agile 
on the industrial front. With clearer priorities in health outcomes and 
deliberate problem-solving rewards, such problem-solving might have 
reached its highest point yet. 
 I recently argued that we should consider an evolving spectrum of 
need and demand (Srinivas, 2014b): Need that is not recognized as need; 
Need that is recognized as need but not as demand; to Recognized, but 
unfulfilled demand; and finally, Effective demand (what is tradition-
ally ‘demand’) and labelled as (2) above. Indeed, part of the toolbox for 
problem-solving is to identify that which is invisible or for which market 
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signals are inappropriate. Indian examples include the Jaipur Foot pros-
thetic and the Oral Polio Vaccine cases, both of which required a rich 
set of actors and organizations that painstakingly problem-solved. In 
the Jaipur foot prosthetic case, actors progressed from identifying needs 
to ensuring that those in need had artificial limbs that worked, were 
caringly customized or could be easily repaired. These were especially 
rewarding outcomes because while road accidents in India had seen 
staggering rises, the state responded pitiably. The Jaipur Foot required 
a strong charitable organization in India to take need to demand in 
various forms, while all the while improving both the technology of 
prosthetics appropriate to the country and attempting to meet both 
domestic and export needs. Ensuring both production and then delivery 
of Oral Polio Vaccines (introduced in 1978, the same year the NDP came 
into force) required non-market instruments. This was because although 
vaccines were free through government programs, they were not easily 
available or, where available, not taken up. Here, too, an immense effort 
was state-led but richly enhanced by non-state partnerships. 
 Two successes further exemplify the potential of well-honed problem-
solving led by, but not limited to, the state. One is India’s sustained and 
unsurpassed success in block-level planning and wide administrative 
and spatial spread for polio immunizations. Private, non-profit organ-
izations, religious groups, labour unions, and many others have thus 
played vital roles in identifying the needs-demand spectrum for policy 
makers and health administrators. 
 The second is emerging urban evidence of success and learning from 
Surat City. Surat, in dealing with plague and then floods, developed 
systematic improvements in disease surveillance. In India’s polio success 
and in Surat’s ambitious disease surveillance, industrial capabilities for 
polio vaccines or diagnostic kits and antibiotics were necessary but 
not sufficient. Challenges after all still remain for Surat in its current 
response to swine flu and its citywide integration of differentiated and 
localized community-level surveillance systems. Both polio and Surat 
have also brought to the fore India’s continued administrative challenges 
in solving last-mile access issues, and the importance of partnerships – 
local and international – in building experimentation and learning. 
 Problem-solving in the realm of vertex (2) therefore requires admin-
istrators to anticipate how (1) and (3) may be speaking to the effec-
tive demand of (3) but not solving the deeper developmental ‘hidden’ 
needs (see also Mitra, 1986). At the end of a good problem-solving 
process, in other words, one should be able to see beyond the obvious. 
The muscle should begin carrying more problem-solving weight and be 
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more flexible. Problem-solving skills can therefore be collective, both 
within and outside the state. Both polio and disease surveillance cases 
exemplify persistent problem-solving exercises through a wider set of 
governance networks which included the state, firms, NGOs and other 
community partners. They also exemplify a clear need for connecting 
market and other instruments to a territorial agenda: national but oper-
ating through block-level strategies in the polio case, and citywide and 
neighbourhood strategies for Surat. 
 An illustrative case of less successful problem-solving demonstrates 
the difference between access in principle versus access in practice. 
Bengaluru (Bangalore) City in Karnataka state is possibly one of India’s 
best sites for medical innovation, and for quality and range of health 
facilities, yet suffers from an unfortunately common lack of attention 
to sustained problem-solving. 5 In the 2012 H1N1 outbreak and in the 
2015 outbreak of swine flu, Bengaluru faced an unchanged situation: 
doctors struggled in government research institutes and treatment 
centres to obtain antibiotics and diagnostic kits. International procure-
ment of diagnostic kits was successful and had ironically steered both 
state and manufacturer away from production to address the domestic 
crises (see also Srinivas, 2006). 6 By 2015, little sustained problem-solving 
had occurred in the state health system in the intervening three years 
since H1N1, and the city’s doctors and patients experienced an alarming 
sense of  deja vu . 7 
 Yet, problem-solving has to be patient. Oral polio vaccines were intro-
duced in 1978. By 2011, India had become polio-free and by 2014 the 
three-year cautionary timeline had passed. State problem-solving is 
never apolitical in this timeline. It may engender bitter debates about 
the need for privatization or allegations of fraud. For instance, there has 
been debate about whether national government policies, which in the 
FME were seen as progenitors of public health, have since deliberately 
undermined public sector production capabilities in vaccines; further-
more, that such policies exaggerated demand data to justify a growing 
role for the private sector’s profits (Madhavi, 2003; Puliyel and Madhavi, 
2008). Worse still is the claim that epidemiological evidence was delib-
erately sidelined and a ‘techno-centrism’ adopted in designing vaccine 
policy (Bajpai and Saraya, 2012), where advance market commitments 
to new technologies have outstripped ‘evidence-based vaccine poli-
cies’ (Madhavi, 2013). The FME and SME strengthened vaccine produc-
tion capabilities and created important procurement spaces for priority 
medicines and vaccines. Multilateral and international vaccine procure-
ment played a much weightier role in the SME in boosting the private 
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sector and creating some tensions between state regulation of exports 
and domestic uptake. 
 Therefore, rather than reaching far too wide by seeing state capacity 
as a normative function across the entire period of productive capa-
bilities, and rather than depending too heavily on the diffuse notion 
of growing ‘good governance’, a focus on problem-solving requires 
policy and planning on the ground to become directed and value-
explicit: for example ‘Everyone – no matter what their economic or 
social status – should have real, measurable access to affordable medi-
cines, vaccines, or diagnostic kits. This priority policy will be enforce-
able by 2020 and will carry explicit penalties for non-performance 
of government agencies or for those seeking windfall private profits 
but not delivering better access’. 8 Problem-solving, in other words, is 
a core state capacity. When done well, problem-solving in the state’s 
line agencies forces dilemmas and discussions about value-proposi-
tions that have then to be designed by networks of actors into policy 
and last-mile planning. 
 Conclusion: strong production, weak problem-solving 
in health 
 The FME was perhaps the most ambitious market environment in the 
convergence it sought between industry and health goals, and the most 
overt in these ambitions. These ambitions were seen in decisions by 
the bureaucracy, through judicial judgements and legal battles against 
multinational firms, through recognition of personnel and delivery 
needs. Yet, was this ambition manifested in sustained problem-solving 
at multiple scales of governance? No. 
 Indian drug policies, wittingly or not, delinked industrial growth from 
health needs, even while the state made several market restructuring 
attempts in order to build capabilities. With the exception of priority 
national health programs, centralized planning targets were focussed on 
production capacity and far less on incentives for demand uptake of 
this capacity and delivery. Despite the rhetoric of grassroots mobiliza-
tion and rural devolution, there were weak decentralized health plans. 
The industrial priorities of the pharmaceutical industry were resolved 
conservatively within the institutional contours of the Ministry of 
Chemicals and Fertilisers rather than those provided by the Ministry of 
Health. 
 While the national government offered carrots and sticks for private 
domestic firms, these focussed mainly on technological advances and 
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market concentration. These incentives encouraged diversification, 
dominance in bulk drugs, process patents and price controls that placed 
caps on health spending and boosted competition. Abrol and Guha 
(1986), for instance, argue that while the country successfully moved 
from formulations capability into more challenging bulk drugs, quality 
consistency suffered. Madhavi (2003) and others have argued that over 
time and with growing technological capabilities, private suppliers 
became emboldened in dictating policy design to the state, favouring 
their own profits over people’s health. Technological advance makes 
domestic resolution of the health industry’s priorities more, not less, 
complex in late industrial economies (Srinivas, 2012). 
 Yet Indian health and industrial goals were quite decisive and conver-
gent in Phase I of the FME when the public sector was involved. After 
all, national priorities and institutionalized problem-solving were 
largely equivalent to the priorities and problem-solving in nationally 
owned public sector firms. However, the problems and the multitude of 
actors grew as the FME progressed, and the problem-solving capabilities, 
although in principle greater, were diffused through the private sector 
and became more difficult for the state to regulate. At no time during 
the FME could quality, safety or guaranteed redress be assured. The value 
priorities related to needs became ironically more obscured by growing 
technological capabilities and by the attractions of the foreign markets 
and growing export earnings. 
 Some nations thus begin problem-solving by creating domestic health 
delivery as the priority even if they import, while other nations do as 
India did, developing and deepening their industrial supply. India 
triumphed in the latter dimension. Yet, there is no ‘best’ starting point 
for any problem-solving; its value-basis, systemic linkages and context 
make it so – points recognized also by Hirschman (1967; 1990). The 
triad is a perpetually co-evolving system in which states make continual 
improvements and build institutional ties (Srinivas, 2014a). Problem-
solving requires institutions that are agile, staff and rules that are both 
flexible but oriented towards timely outcomes, and outcome meas-
ures that are clear, transparent and can be monitored and enforced. 
Without these credible commitments to problem-solving towards 
health outcomes, more generalized state capacities become irrelevant 
and illegitimate. 
 Two market environments have now passed, and a third arguably 
is still under way with biotechnologies changing how we contend 
with all aspects of health care. The decades since 1950 have demon-
strated that Indian production of generic medicines, diagnostic kits, 
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biopharmaceuticals and vaccines has grown stronger and ever more 
sophisticated. In the absence of regular exercise to connect its vertices, 
however, the triad remains slack and the state’s problem-solving muscles 
weakened. Rather than resembling a dynamic, co-evolving triad, the 
result is then an ossified triangle with its base vertices unable to dictate 
terms to its apex. 
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 1 .  See Sahu’s (1998) slightly different periodization but whose emphasis is also 
on production capabilities. 
 2 .  For example, Karnataka state in South India has experimented quite substan-
tially with health care insurance systems (demand) and new pharmaceutical 
stocking and distribution practices (delivery). Although quite progressive in 
this regard, it has no deliberate state or urban administrative mechanisms to 
test the integration regularly. 
 3 .  See also Stoker and Jeffery (1988: 565). 
 4 .  For the range of specific cases, and contentions and ambiguities, see Sahu 
(1998) and Srinivas (2006, 2012). Stoker and Jeffrey (1988) discuss the New 
Drug Policy and foreign firms. The Astra-IDL case emphasized that foreign 
firms benefitted from the state’s unresolved priorities. Most of its arguments 
about producing a drug already available in India were to emphasize the novel-
ties in production process and the foreign exchange savings to the country. 
Most questions from bureaucrats to Astra in turn focussed on manufacturing 
details, employment and local industry effects, and financial priorities such as 
royalties, branding, export priorities and shares (Ibid: 565). 
 5 .  In the Hindu newspaper story, the same leading Head of Department of 
Neuro-Virology in Bangalore NIMHANS admits to shortages of A(H1N1) 
testing kits, and although orders had been placed, they had to stop testing 
because of the unfulfilled orders;  http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/
karnataka/shortage-of-ah1n1-testing-kits-worries-patients/article3359557.
ece , last accessed 27 December 2014. 
 6 .  http://www.deccanherald.com/content/459453/state-facing-shortage-swine-
flu.html , last accessed 29 March 2015. Srinivas (2006) makes a similar point 
that international vaccine procurement programs had offered important 
benefits to Indian firms. However, Indian regulators and health administra-
tors would have to redesign Indian vaccine policies and plans in order to 
attend to domestic health priorities. Madhavi (2003, 2013) emphasizes the 
undue influence exerted by private firms on state priorities. 
 7 .  See also Kotwani et al. (2007) on uneven availability of common drugs. 
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 8 .  Although former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made her famous Alma Ata 
speech at the WHO on not allowing profiteering from life or death, she did 
not unfortunately vow to boost problem-solving alongside. 
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